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An Analysis of the Military
Strategy of Douglas MacArthur

Major William B. Martin 84-1685

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TITLE AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

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PREFACE

The Air Command and Staff College(ACSC) Strategy Process Model was used to analyze the military strategy of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur's strategy was compared and contrasted with the Strategy Process Model.

Of course, strategy is created by people and it is helpful to know something of the person who is being analyzed. To give the reader some understanding of MacArthur's thought process, ample biographical, historical, and career information is included.

I have enjoyed researching and writing this paper. Hopefully, I have gained a deeper appreciation for military history which will go with me after ACSC. The strategy process is a whole new world. If I have learned anything about strategy it is due to the untiring efforts of the ACSC faculty and the insightful thinking of my classmates. I fully intend to continue my study of military history and the strategy process.

I want to thank Colonel Robert W. Kline, my advisor, for his patience and understanding. Colonel Kline's candid criticisms and knowledge of military history were very helpful in guiding me. Also, to my wife, Sumire, who gave moral support, helped with the typing, and kept hot coffee available, I dedicate this paper to you.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major William B. Martin graduated from Officer Training School in August, 1971 after serving a number of years in the enlisted ranks. He has been a Russian linguist, an Imagery Interpreter, an Imagery Intelligence Officer, and a Human Resources Intelligence Officer. He has served tours with Electronics Security Command, Tactical Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, Strategic Air Command, and Air Force Intelligence Service. Geographically, Major Martin has been assigned to Lowry AFB, Colorado; Langley AFB, Virginia; Persidio of Monterey, California; Blytheville AFB, Arkansas; and has overseas service in Japan, Vietnam, and South Korea.

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INTRODUCTION

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1880-1962) wore the uniform of his country for more than fifty years. His service began before the turn of the century (1899) when he entered the United States Military Academy at West Point, and ended when President Truman relieved him of command on April 11, 1951. Or, said another way, he began his service when the horse was the most common means of transportation and continued into the age of nuclear weapons and supersonic jet aircraft. Throughout this long term of service, the West Point motto of Duty-Honor-Country served as his guiding light.

But his professed love and honor for his country did not prevent MacArthur from being a controversial figure for much of his career. His controversial nature made him good copy for the media that both castigated him and built him into an American hero. Even those closest to him, his friends and staff, often disagreed about the real Douglas MacArthur. To some, he was supreme among generals and the wisest among statesmen. To others, he was simply a self-serving, pompous showman who surrounded himself with sycophants. It is true that he was always a showman. But being a showman did not detract from the fact that he enjoyed considerable success as a military commander.

As a military strategist, MacArthur has been variously

described as a virtuoso, as a master strategist, as an incompetent, and as a "lucky" general. President Truman called him a counterfeit; World War II troops in the Pacific often vilified him with nicknames which described his supposed cowardice. On the other hand, World War I doughboys swore he was the bravest man they had ever seen. But what do the records say of his endeavors?

MacArthur had brilliant successes interspersed with uninspiring battlefield actions and some outright failures. In the early World War II period, his defense of the Philippines and the early campaigns in New Guinea lacked imagination and were lackluster at best. Later, some of his Southwest Pacific island campaigns were magnificent. Yet, there are detractors who claim MacArthur often took credit for the brilliance of his subordinate commanders, or that he was lucky. About Inchon, there can be no doubt. MacArthur was the sole architect of this ingenious maneuver. But, following hard on the heels of Inchon came the disastrous amphibious operation at Wonsan. So we find the real MacArthur, as military commander and as strategist, hard to uncover. But, perhaps history will not honor Douglas MacArthur for what he wrecked and demolished as a warrior and great captain so much as it will remember him for what he reconstructed.

MacArthur was the architect of the resurrection of Japan. As Supreme Allied Commander Pacific, MacArthur was more than a military commander. He was the prime mover in rewriting the

constitution and establishing Japan's future course. He installed a brand of democracy peculiar to Japan and set that country on a path which has led to its current position as an economic giant among world nations.

Was MacArthur a military giant? Was he a great captain? This paper examines MacArthur by using the Air Command and Staff College Strategy Process Model as an analytical tool. World War II and the Korean Conflict were his main arenas. These two battlefields provided the stage for MacArthur to act out his strategy dramas, and it is in these two arenas that comparisons and contrasts with the Strategy Process Model are most lucrative.

MacArthur was a supremely talented man. At times he was too large for his role as a military commander. Yet, he was, on balance, a giant among military leaders. He must be classified as one of history's great captains.

Chapter One

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

ALL ROADS LEAD TO WEST POINT

Douglas MacArthur was born on January 26, 1880 at Arsenal Barracks, Little Rock, Arkansas, the third and last child of Arthur MacArthur and Mary Pinkney Hardy (11:18-19). Douglas' grandfather, also named Arthur MacArthur, immigrated to the United States from Scotland. The MacArthurs are descended from the MacArtiar clan, an ancient Scottish family supposedly connected with King Arthur's court (11:7). Douglas' father, Arthur, was a career Army officer who served with the Union Army during the Civil War. Known as the "boy colonel" because he was promoted to that rank at the age of 19, Arthur won the Congressional Medal of Honor for bravery in a battle at Missionary Ridge near Chattanooga, Tennessee (11:13). During his 46 year career, Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur became the ranking general in the Army. However, a conflict with Howard Taft denied him appointment as Chief of Staff.

Douglas' mother, "Pinky" Hardy, was from an old Virginia family which traced its American heritage to Jamestown days. The Hardy family produced a number of influential persons, including military officers (11:18). Douglas was proud of his

heritage and tried to bring honor to the MacArthur name during his lifetime.

Douglas MacArthur spent most of his childhood in remote western Army outposts. There he gained an informal education in soldiering, riding, and shooting as he mixed with the garrison population on a daily basis. However, formal education was a scarce commodity. Pinky was both mother and teacher as she tutored the MacArthur children in the three R's. Obviously, the tutoring was effective. Arthur, the oldest MacArthur child, graduated in the upper part of his class at the Naval Academy, then reached the rank of captain in the Navy before dying prematurely in 1923 at the age of 47 (11:23). The academic achievements of Douglas were even more brilliant.

At 13, Douglas enrolled at the West Texas Military Academy in San Antonio. MacArthur excelled in academics and athletics during his three years at the Academy. On the academic side, despite the fact he was a day student only, he graduated first in his class. In athletics, he quarterbacked the football team, played shortstop on the baseball team, and was the Academy's tennis champion (12:58). For the next three years, Douglas and his mother dedicated themselves to obtaining an appointment to the United States Military Academy.

MacArthur succeeded in obtaining the coveted appointment through competitive examination in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, scoring a 99.33. The next highest score was 78.9 (12:61).

MacArthur entered West Point in 1899 while his father was posted to the Philippines. With the General away, and in order to keep an eye on young Douglas, Pinky rented an apartment at West Point with a view of her son's dormitory room. Her presence provided whatever additional motivation MacArthur may have needed. He became First Captain of the Cadet Corps and graduated at the top of his class with an average of 98.14, the third highest average in the history of the Academy (12:68).

THE LONG ROAD TO INCHON

From 1903, when he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Engineers, until World War I, six significant events shaped MacArthur's life and career. First, he was posted to the Philippines where he became enchanted with the land and the people. Second, in 1905, he accompanied his famous father on an eight month grand tour of nine Asian nations. During the tour he observed military maneuvers, actual combat, and talked with military leaders of several nations. The third significant event saw MacArthur assigned as an aide-de-camp to President Theodore Roosevelt (12:80-81). His friendship with the Roosevelt family continued until the death of President Franklin Roosevelt. Fourth, after the aide-de-camp assignment, MacArthur spent several years away from Washington before returning in 1913 as the most junior member of the Army General Staff (12:86). The fifth and sixth events occurred

while MacArthur was a member of the General Staff. In 1914, General Leonard Wood sent MacArthur on a special reconnaissance mission to Veracruz, Mexico. In Veracruz, American and Mexican forces faced each other in a potentially explosive situation. MacArthur's heroics in locating locomotives for potential use by the American forces earned him a nomination for the Congressional Medal of Honor. However, the recommendation was not approved (12:89). Finally, as a junior major, he was the War Department's news sensor in 1916. This responsibility brought him in constant contact with the news media. MacArthur thoroughly impressed the news media. These six events, then, set the stage for his meteoric rise in rank and responsibility just prior to, and during, World War I.

MacArthur was a major force in organizing and training the famous Rainbow (42nd) Division. The Rainbow consisted of unattached National Guard units from 26 states. MacArthur was the Rainbow's first Chief of Staff, and one year later, Brigadier General MacArthur commanded the Rainbow in France. During his time with the 42nd Division, MacArthur received numerous American and foreign awards and decorations for heroism and bravery in battle. (see Appendix 4) And once again, he was recommended for, but did not receive, the Congressional Medal of Honor (12:94-106). After six months with the occupation forces in Germany, MacArthur returned to the United States to become the new superintendent at the Military Academy.

At the direction of General Pershing, MacArthur

reinvigorated West Point. His first battle was with Congress. Congress wanted to cut the West Point program to two years. MacArthur persuaded Congress to retain the four year program. Other MacArthur changes at West Point included improved academic standards, prohibitions on hazing, and institution of the first comprehensive college intramural sports program in the United States (12:134-135).

MacArthur departed West Point in 1922. The next eight years brought a variety of assignments including corps commander at three different locations - Baltimore, Atlanta, and San Francisco. The most significant tours, however, were two separate postings to the Philippines and designation as President of the 1928 United States Olympic Team.

In 1930, Major General MacArthur was selected ahead of several more senior officers as the youngest Chief of Staff in the history of the Army. During his tenure (1930-1935), MacArthur instituted a number of reforms and fought hard to keep the Army afloat during the lean budget depression years. MacArthur was a reasonably successful Chief of Staff, but he incurred the wrath of several powerful individuals and groups in Washington. He was unpopular with many politicians because of his heavy handed tactics against the 1932 Bonus Expeditionary Force marchers, and because of an attitude that many congressmen felt was arrogance. However, he was retained by President Roosevelt for an additional year beyond the normal Chief of Staff tour.

In 1935, MacArthur departed Washington for his fourth tour in the Philippines. This time he was tasked with preparing defenses in anticipation of Philippine independence. He did not return to Washington for 16 years. MacArthur retired from the Army in 1937 and became a full time adviser to Philippines President Quezon. Additionally, he gave himself the title of Field Marshal of the Philippine Army and set about the task of raising and training an army to defend the Philippines.

By 1941, the Japanese became more menacing in Asia, and MacArthur was recalled to active duty and placed in charge of all armed forces in the Far East. The attack came in December 1941. In March, 1942, on Presidential orders, MacArthur departed the Philippines for Australia where he established the Southwest Pacific command to oppose the Japanese in Asia.

MacArthur returned to the Philippines with his armies in 1944, and when Japan fell in 1945, he became Supreme Allied Commander Pacific (SCAP). He held the SCAP post until 1951. Additionally, with the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, MacArthur assumed additional duties as Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE) and Commander United Nations Command Korea.

MACARTHUR IS FIRED

As the Korean Conflict progressed, serious misunderstandings developed between MacArthur and President Truman. President Truman viewed the problems in Korea from a global

perspective in light of United States national objectives and grand strategy. MacArthur could not understand the Washington philosophy on Korea and publicly aired his disagreement with President Truman's policies. Truman fired MacArthur on April 11, 1951 and MacArthur returned to the United States for the first time in 14 years.

MacArthur spent his first year back in the United States testifying before Congress, making speeches, and conducting an abortive campaign for President. Thereafter, he lived a relatively quiet life until his death in 1964.

Chapter Two

PREPARATION

WORLD WAR ONE

World War I was MacArthur's testing ground. He demonstrated great courage, developed his capacity for hard work and detailed planning, and emerged as a charismatic leader. Prior to World War I, MacArthur's largest command had been a company of engineers. He had no professional military education; however, he had spent three years just prior to the war on the General Staff. On the battlefield, he quickly learned the art of war.

MacArthur fearlessly led his troops into battle. He organized large and small unit actions and led reconnaissance patrols into the deadly no man's land. But sometimes it was hard to distinguish whether he was brave or foolhardy. For example, he was gassed twice because he didn't carry a gas mask. His scarf had bullet holes in it. And once, he returned from a patrol as the only survivor. MacArthur's battle dress reflects his belief that a leader should be different; he should stand out from the crowd and be recognizable.

He wore his smashed-down cap instead of a steel helmet, and the rest of his outfit was outlandish by standards of the western front: a four-foot muffler knitted by his mother, a turtleneck sweater,

immaculate riding breeches, and cavalry boots with a mirror finish....His only weapon was a riding crop (12:101).

Both his methods and his dress were unorthodox, but he was successful. Much of his success was a direct result of hard work and detailed planning. According to his aide,

'Alone, he made notes on a card, and by the time we left for a staff discussion he had the plans all worked out. He was meticulous in organization and consummate in planning' (12:100).

Equally important, MacArthur established a leadership style which continued throughout his career. He was highly visible, soft spoken, gentlemanly, and lavished praise on those around him. He reserved the important leadership functions for himself, but readily delegated functional areas. "More and more he was delegating authority for operations, intelligence and administration to majors and lieutenant colonels" (12:100).

World War I also had its disenchanting side for MacArthur. He became thoroughly disgusted with bloody trench warfare and told a reporter in France, "This was undoubtedly the last trench war. The next would be a 'war of mobility'" (1:47).

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

MacArthur's force planning and development ideas and actions while he was Chief of Staff are part of his annual reports between 1930-1935. In his first annual report, he described his basic beliefs on war. "The objective of any warring nation is victory, immediate and complete" (19:56),

and, "The greatest need for a nation at war is immediate and decisive victory" (19:84).

During the depression years, MacArthur's main task as Chief of Staff was keeping the Army intact and financially afloat. He fought the battle of the budget with mixed success, but was able to persuade Congress to keep the Army financially solvent. However, the sparse budget had a significant influence on overall thinking about planning and force development. Amalgamation of the Army and Navy was one budget issue; a separate air service was another. Other issues which surfaced during the MacArthur years were mobilization, restructuring the Army, and mechanization.

Because of the tight budget, there were many advocates of combining the Army and Navy into a single service under a single department. MacArthur did not agree. He believed the roles and missions of the Army and Navy were so different that a single military department could not properly manage them. In fact, he thought that only the President should have the power to control the total military instrument of grand strategy. In his 1932 report MacArthur stated, "The line between the Army and Navy fields of activity, namely, the coastline, is an insurmountable geographic obstacle for each" (19:145).

The 1932 report also contained MacArthur's position on a separate air service. He believed that air power should be organic to the activity it supports. He had serious doubts about the control and use of a separate air service, and he

thought the budget could not accomodate it. He cited the independent air forces of Great Britain and France as examples of financial irresponsibility and frivolity (19:159-151).¹

MacArthur believed one of the most important issues facing the United States was a mobilization plan which could be quickly and effectively implemented in time of emergency. World War I mobilization had turned out poorly trained soldiers, produced equipment shortages, and had been slow and inefficient. MacArthur proposed to fix the problem, but met considerable opposition and criticism. Opposition came from those who could not understand the need for a mobilization plan in peacetime, and labeled such activities as warmongering. Criticism came from those who thought it presumptuous of MacArthur and beyond the scope of his responsibilities. MacArthur said,

...some of this activity lies outside the scope of the War Department....armies and navies and their supporting fleets are but important elements in the whole war-making team....only War and Navy Departments have direct legal responsibilities affecting national security....Otherwise such plans would probably be neglected, and consequently unavailable when needed (19:83).

1 MacArthur later changed his mind about the separate air service issue. During World War II in the Southwest Pacific, he employed General George Kenney's Fifth Air Force in much the same way a modern day Air Force component command of a Joint theater command is employed. The results were so remarkable that MacArthur reevaluated his previous stand. He told Kenney, "At that time [1932] I opposed it [separate air service] with every resource at my command. It was the greatest mistake of my career" (6:115). He also erased much of the "coastline" barrier between the Army and Navy in his many successful amphibious operations.

MacArthur's mobilization plan included selective service, general procurement, munitions procurement, industrial base planning, selection and training of personnel, administrative machinery, and price control regulation. He pushed his plan through despite opposition.²

To support his mobilization plan, MacArthur restructured the Army's command lines. In 1932, there were nine relatively independent corps areas in the United States. MacArthur determined the command authority simply was not workable or responsive in a mobilization situation. He reorganized into four armies - North, South, East, and West - and made the armies directly responsible to the Chief of Staff (19:168). In effect, MacArthur changed the Army from its traditional role in America of regionally oriented forces to a national army.

MacArthur had one opportunity to test his mobilization plan. President Roosevelt tasked him with organizing the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The mobilization plan worked well in planning, organizing, and smoothly administering the nationwide effort to enlist unmarried young men into the CCC.

One additional problem tackled by MacArthur was mechanization. In the 1930's, there were two basic theories. Fuller and Lidell-Hart believed mechanized units should operate independently while others believed mechanization or mechanized units should be organic. MacArthur held the latter view.

² The MacArthur mobilization plan was the key to mobilization of the country's resources in World War II.

He broke up the experimental mechanized force at Fort Eustis, Virginia and redistributed the resources. He believed integrating mechanization and "motorization" into regular Army units to be the more effective method and tasked the infantry to develop machines to increase their striking power. However, recognizing the importance of mobility in special missions, he tasked the cavalry with developing motorized reconnaissance units.

MacArthur's contributions to the Army and to the nation as Chief of Staff were relatively significant. Heavily constrained by depression era finances, he influenced retaining organic air services, championed continued separation of the Army and Navy, designed an effective mobilization plan, and set the Army on its primary course of mechanization.

Chapter Three

THE STRATEGY VIRTUOSO

Part I - World War II

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the United States in World War II were straightforward and understandable - preservation of democracy and freedom for itself and its allies. Thus, the nation committed itself to annihilating Japan and Germany. To accomplish this, the nation was mobilized to meet a two ocean threat. Politically, the nation was of one accord in supporting the government in its decision to go to war. The American people believed war was the only alternative and overwhelmingly supported the government. Economically, the resources of the nation were marshalled to defeat the advocates of oppression in the world, namely, Nazi Germany and her allies in Europe, and the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of the Japanese in Asia. Once the nation was mobilized, a strategy to defeat the enemy was needed.

GRAND STRATEGY

Regardless of contingency plans that existed prior to December, 1941, and regardless of the continual military build-up prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States did

not have an integrated grand strategy to fight a two ocean war. After Pearl Harbor, the United States was definitely on the defensive. In fact, many Americans feared a direct attack on the continental United States.

Without disregarding the threat from Japan, the United States made the conscious effort to place primary emphasis on Europe and defeating Nazi Germany first. This decision had a telling effect on MacArthur's efforts to hold the Philippines against Japanese attack, and his efforts to organize a defense of Asia from Australia after his escape from the Philippines.

MacArthur expected supplies and reinforcements from the United States in accordance with the Orange Plans, the contingency war plans for Asia. He had every right to expect support from the United States, and he promised the Philippine people that support would soon be arriving. Little did he know that a conscious decision had been made in Washington to write off the Philippines because of the difficulty of delivering supplies, and because of the decision to support Europe first. Politics, cultural ties and economic ties with Europe, and the perception that England was in mortal danger of falling to the Nazis forced a Europe first policy which denied MacArthur his coveted supplies and reinforcements. MacArthur was embittered at the thought of Europe taking precedence over his beloved Asia. He never fully recovered. The idea haunted him until the very end and played a major part in his eventual dismissal by President Truman.

MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS

MacArthur's military strategy during World War II in the Pacific can be divided into three parts: defense of the Philippines; defense of Australia; and the island hopping, by-passing offensive. Each segment used a different kind of strategy. Defense of the Philippines consisted primarily of a five months holdout on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor. The defense of Australia involved keeping the enemy distracted and off balance while MacArthur was massing the men and materials for a counteroffensive. Part three was primarily amphibious and used the now famous by-passing strategy in a vast area of the Pacific Ocean.

In the Philippines, MacArthur had a unique situation that seldom occurs for military leaders. He developed and deployed the armed forces for an entire nation, then employed these same forces in defense of the nation. As special military adviser to Philippines President Manuel Quezon and Field Marshal of the Philippines Army, MacArthur recruited, trained, and equipped the Philippine armed forces. The central part of his plan was developing a professional officer corps. To do this, he established the Philippines Military Academy as a mirror image of the United States Military Academy.

MacArthur had a ten year plan for raising and training forces capable of defending the Philippines. In addition to the Military Academy, he expected considerable monies and materials from the United States as well as from the Philippine

government. Unfortunately, due to financial and political constraints, he was only four years into his plan and well behind schedule when the Japanese attacked in December, 1941. MacArthur, caught short, became involved in a life and death struggle for the existence of the Philippine nation, with his inexperienced and ill-equipped forces.

The implementation of War Plan Orange 3, the plan for the defense of the Philippines, had mixed results. MacArthur received the Congressional Medal of Honor for the defense.

However, many have been critical of his actions, while others have praised him. General Pershing called his sideslip movement into Bataan Peninsula was one of the greatest tactical movements of all time (20:19). Major General Courtney Whitney is highly complimentary of MacArthur, placing the blame for failure on Washington. Whitney said,

He thereupon proposed another plan for cutting Japan's vital lines of communication. But, like his other positive plans, it was apparently overwhelmed by the tide of negativism then running in Washington (21:43).

John Jacob Beck, in MacArthur and Wainwright: Sacrifice of the Philippines, is very critical of certain aspects of MacArthur's actions.

MacArthur made several errors in judgment that hastened the fall of the Philippines. He completely overestimated the quality and capability of the Philippine Army....MacArthur should have...obtainedadditional troops from the United States....he was naive and unrealistic....MacArthur neglected the logistics requirements of the Filamerican Army (2:236).

MacArthur concentrated on tactics to the detriment of insuring his men had sufficient supplies available. He had determined that Manila was virtually undefendable due to its location on a flat plain. Therefore, he decided to withdraw, according to his contingency plan, to the Bataan Peninsula. However, the swiftness with which the outer rings of the Philippine defense collapsed caught MacArthur by surprise, and he was forced to sideslip his forces to Bataan and Corregidor more hurriedly than anticipated. In the rush to get to Bataan, coordination and movement of supplies and equipment were overlooked. Even in the contingency plan, only 40,000 troops were planned for. Instead, 80,000 troops plus 26,000 civilians populated Bataan (8:72). As a result, the troops were on half rations from the first day; malaria and dysentery were prevalent everywhere, and there was a severe shortage of medicine. Colonel Achille C. Tisdale, one of those who surrendered at Bataan, commented, "Ours was a logistics, not a military defeat" (2:236).

The United States and Philippine armies held out for five months on Bataan. It has been estimated that even with the poorly trained, ill-equipped troops MacArthur had on Bataan, if he had taken the proper precautions of food, medicine, and fortifications, he probably could have held out 2-3 times that long (15:54). MacArthur never forgot the importance of logistics in his future actions.

MacArthur's next task, defense of Australia, was primarily a job of organizing the forces available to him, American and

Australian. As Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific (CINCSWPA), MacArthur directed a force of combined arms. Fearing an invasion of Australia, MacArthur established footholds in New Guinea and adjacent islands to distract the Japanese from Australia. At the same time, the Navy of his combined command was harassing the Japanese troop ships and keeping sea lanes open for supplies and reinforcements from the United States. General Kenney's Fifth Air Force was engaging the enemy in the air at a distance from Australia. As a result, whatever plans the Japanese had for invading Australia were turned aside. MacArthur, as CINCSWAPA, must be given credit for making it work, even though his component commanders were brilliant in executing his directives. Australia can be characterized as a holding operation where force coordination and buildup occurred. Innovative strategic actions were next to impossible under such circumstances. However, MacArthur's time was coming, with the advent of the by-passing strategy.

By-passing and, thereby, isolating Japanese strongholds was not a MacArthur idea. The idea developed in the Aleutian and Solomon islands. It was noted that when a strong Japanese position had been by-passed in the Aleutians because the Americans did not possess sufficient strength to attack the strong point, the Japanese abandoned the by-passed island. Later in the war, a similar situation occurred in the Solomons. After that, by-passing became a deliberate strategy encouraged by the Joint Chiefs in Washington. At first, MacArthur rejected

the idea, but once he embraced it, he developed it and used it to perfection. "...he transformed the bypass maneuver into the war's most momentous strategic concept" (12:391). Moreover, MacArthur applied all he knew about history, maps, strategy, and the Japanese, to defeat them.

By the late spring of 1943, the General probably knew more about the geography of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon islands than any man before or since....and none of them [Japanese] could fathom MacArthur. They simply didn't know how to cope with his fluidity and flexibility in the campaigns after Buna....The General's gifts were those of a strategist, an architect of warfare. There, quite simply, he had no peer in any World War II theater, in any army (12:383-4).

By-passing was used effectively in conjunction with MacArthur's love for feinting and choosing alternative objectives. The Japanese were isolated and cut off from their supply lines. Literally hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops were left to rot away in the jungles and rainforests of the Southwest Pacific while the main battlefronts by-passed them on the way north to the Philippines.

Not satisfied to remain the theoretician, MacArthur often extended his control to the battlefield.

The General....ordered feints at Wewak and Hansa Bay [New Guinea]Since Buna, he had learned to gather all the reins in his hands at the start of an operation....The General's guiding hand was reaching down, not only to divisional commanders, but to regiments and, at times, to battalions (12:400).

And thus he guided his forces steadily back to the Philippines, then to Japan.

In analyzing World War II in the Pacific, Lidell-Hart said,

It looked as if the road back to the Philippines, and thence to Japan itself would be an interminable journey. But in the autumn of 1943, the pace improved with the adoption of a by-passing method that was a variant of the strategy of indirect approach....A notable feature throughout these later operations was the way that each by-passing move utilized the choice of alternative objectives to keep the enemy baffled as to the specific aim.... Thus the strategic indirectness of each move was multiplied in effect (7:273-274).

So we can see that MacArthur's strategy varied considerably as World War II progressed, but basically, it can be described as proceeding through three phases: strategic and tactical defense in the Philippines, strategic defense and regrouping efforts in Australia, and the strategic offensive.

Part II - Korean Conflict

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The national objectives of the United States and the objectives of the United Nations largely dovetail in the Korean Conflict. The first objective in Korea was containment of communism based on the United States policy of containment. It was generally assumed that communism would try to break out of its containment in Europe. In such a case, the commitment of the United States to support its European allies would have been clear, definable, and probably supported by the

citizens of the United States. However, something quite different happened.

When the North Koreans invaded the South with the objective of politically bridging the two halves of Korea, the Western World was confused. The confusion continued until the armistice, even though the objectives were spelled out. The first objective was published as a United Nations Security Council Resolution on June 27, 1950.

...Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and having noted that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, ...Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area (18:24).

In other words, restore the status quo. MacArthur was assigned the task of repelling the attack, which he did. But once the attack was repelled, politics got in the way. The Truman administration, flushed with victory, and looking toward the November elections, moved beyond its containment policy (9:14). And so it was that on 27 September, 1950, the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur that his new objective in Korea was the destruction of the North Korean armed forces (22:73).

The North Korean forces were routed, but a new situation developed when the Chinese entered the war in November, 1950, and pushed the United Nations forces back below the 38th

parallel. Once the lines were reestablished near the 38th parallel, the United States gradually returned to the original objective of containment.

GRAND STRATEGY

At the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, the grand strategy of the United States was myopic - ringing the Soviet Union with bases and forces to prevent a breakout. The Truman administration saw the main threat of communism as being in Western Europe. Korea was a mere side show. The administration simply could not take the chance of an expanded war in Asia which might draw in the full force of the Chinese, and possibly the Soviets as well. MacArthur could not support the administration's limited objectives strategy and spoke out openly of his opposition. "...in defiance of orders to clear his public statements with Washington, the President on April 11, 1951, announced the general's relief from command" (20:391).

The most obvious reason that he was relieved from command was his outspoken opposition to Truman's grand strategy of containment and Europe first. MacArthur wanted to pursue a "victory" strategy, but the administration insisted on a "limited war". In other words, the administration wanted to draw the line on communist aggression in Korea, not punish the perceived master perpetrators. But why did the administration espouse such a policy?

In retrospect, it can be seen that the American military

instrument of power in 1950 was weak compared to the conventional forces of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Red China could easily mass one million troops in North China. The prospect of facing one or the other, or a combined Soviet/Chinese conventional force in Asia was terrifying. Furthermore, Asia, and especially Korea, wasn't even the prize - Europe was the prize. We could not permit ourselves to be drained militarily and economically in Asia at the expense of Western Europe. The Europeans were also concerned since the welfare and security of Europe was paramount to them, and the threat to Europe was perceived as increased if the Americans should weaken themselves militarily in Western Europe. MacArthur did not see it that way, and staked his reputation in an effort to gain a political decision. He believed the battle with communism was here and now, and the challenge in Korea must be met full force.

On top of the Europe/Asia priority controversy, the problem of whether to use Chiang Kai-shek's volunteers from Formosa further clouded judgement. MacArthur wanted to use them to divert Communist Chinese attention away from Korea. On this issue, MacArthur and the State Department became embroiled in a hot debate over neutralizing Nationalist China (1:147). General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up Washington's position on Korea and meeting the communist threat in Asia when he said,

'So long as we regarded the Soviet Union as the main antagonist and Western Europe as the main prize,

'the measures MacArthur advocated would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy' (9:56).

While the grand strategy crisis was boiling between Washington and Tokyo, additional issues entered the picture. MacArthur decided to publicly challenge the Washington strategy. Perhaps he thought he could carry it off. As de facto emperor of Japan, he certainly would not be dismissed lightly. He was highly successful in his emperor role. Richard Rovere commented, "There is no question that in his role as emperor-in-being, MacArthur had been a complete success. He played his role better than any other he had ever undertaken (15:160). MacArthur was banking on his popularity, his audacity, and his friends in Washington to pull him through. After all, they always had. But MacArthur had not been in Washington in 15 years. With the exception of Omar Bradley, the current members of the Joint Chiefs had never worked with MacArthur and didn't even know him. Bradley had met him once - eight years before.

But MacArthur was determined to win his victory with Washington. He followed his own formula of "there is no substitute for victory". However, he forgot, or failed to recognize, that the government was in far greater need for prestige than himself (4:182).

So we can see that we have a double problem. The first problem is a grand strategy crisis evolving from the government's perception the United States should seek limited

objectives in Korea, vice MacArthur, who wanted victory. As a consequence, he spoke out publicly against Washington's policies. In turn, Washington, and specifically, President Truman, believed MacArthur, a military man, had challenged the sacred civilian control of the military.

Clayton James in Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War thinks that while the two issues discussed were civilian control of the military and grand strategy disagreements, the real issue was one of command structure and command crisis, primarily involving communication and coordination (5:4). Washington, including the Joint Chiefs, was simply unable, or unwilling, to relay proper commands to MacArthur. Apparently the MacArthur reputation for genius, brilliance, and defiance cowered the Joint Chiefs. That was especially true after the successful Inchon landings which the Joint Chiefs had opposed. MacArthur was quite used to doing as he pleased and presenting fait accompli as necessary. However, the world had changed. MacArthur had not been in Washington during the development of the new strategy of containment, and he had difficulty accepting it. MacArthur was out of concert with the command structure. His time honored ideas of war of which he often so eloquently spoke did not always fit the new grand strategy.

'But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory - not prolonging indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory' (10:17).

Thus, MacArthur could not accept the concept of limited objectives. President Truman said in his memoirs, "it would have wrecked our global strategy to achieve objectives in Korea" (14:244).

MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS

MacArthur's military strategy in Korea was remarkably similar to his successful strategies in the Pacific during World War II. His command was also similar. He commanded an international force of combined arms consisting of air, ground, naval, and amphibious components. He employed his air component for interdiction and his naval component for amphibious operations to support his favorite tactic of envelopment by sea. MacArthur approached Korea as if it were an island, but Korea is not an island. The fourth side provided a land bridge and a sanctuary. MacArthur, as Commander in Chief Far East forces and Commander, United Nations Command - Korea, was tasked with halting the North Koreans. His announced strategy to halt the advance was to commit his forces piecemeal. According to Richard Rovere, the piecemeal strategy was not a brilliant MacArthur strategem at all, but simply MacArthur making a virtue of necessity. The necessity, in this case, was severely constrained transportation and supplies availability. Piecemeal was really the only option he had (15:88). The occupation forces in Japan and the few American advisors in South Korea were ill-prepared to go to war.

Ill-prepared as they may have been, MacArthur's forces succeeded in grinding the North Korean advance to a halt at the southern tip of the peninsula near the city of Pusan. Overextended North Korean supply lines, a poor transportation network, fresh United Nations troops, and the shrinking, more defensible Pusan perimeter all acted to halt the North Korean advance. Additionally, the North Koreans did not have air superiority or air cover which left them vulnerable to air interdiction.

MacArthur's Korean problems began early on when Chiang Kai-shek offered 25,000 troops to the United Nations forces. Understandably, MacArthur wanted the troops, but he ran head on into the State Department which had little love for the Generalissimo. Instead, a naval blockade was established between Formosa and the mainland, more to keep Chiang on Formosa than to prevent a Communist Chinese invasion of Formosa (16:viii).

MacArthur advocated increased support of Chiang since he didn't want to see the Chinese Communists take over Formosa and turn it into an unsinkable aircraft carrier (16:74). But even if MacArthur could have had the 25,000 Formosan troops, there was no way to transport them to the battlefield and take care of them. Thus, MacArthur was constrained early by logistics and politics.

The second part of the MacArthur strategy in Korea was the amphibious landings at Inchon and Wonsan. MacArthur planned the Inchon operation, then sold it to the Joint Chiefs,

who opposed it as too risky. MacArthur sold his plan with the argument that,

The amphibious landing is the most powerful tool we have....We must strike deep and hard into enemy territory. The deep envelopment, based upon surprise, which severs the enemy's supply lines, is and always has been, the most decisive maneuver in war (20:386).

Operation CHROMITE, the Inchon landing, was highly successful and trapped the North Koreans in a giant pincer while severing their supply lines. The North Korean forces quickly disintegrated. The Inchon landing, the epitome of a successful amphibious operation, proved to be MacArthur's last hurrah.

With the remnants of the North Korean Army fleeing north, MacArthur extracted the 8th Army and the 1st Marine Division through the Inchon port, transported them around the south tip of Korea to the Sea of Japan for an amphibious landing further north at Wonsan. Problems were immediate.

The port of Inchon was tied up with incoming cargo. Extracting the landing force overtaxed the port facility and slowed delivery of supplies and hampered the extraction. Robert Smith, in MacArthur in Korea: The Naked Emperor, criticized MacArthur severely for this maneuver. He believes the supply flow in Korea never recovered and was partly responsible for the rout of the United Nations forces by the Chinese later on.

As for the landing force, by the time the ships reached Wonsan, the 3rd Republic of Korea Army had arrived in Wonsan

days earlier, on foot.

The strategic soundness of the next phase of the advance is questionable. MacArthur had two completely separate major forces in Korea - X Corps under the command of his friend Lieutenant General Almond, and 8th Army, under the command of Walton Walker. The two forces operated independently. As the two forces pushed through Korea toward the Yalu River on the Chinese border, one force pushed up the right coast and the other up the left coast. The center was left open. When the Chinese intervened, they came down the middle, splitting the two forces, then turned left and right to envelop large parts of both United Nations forces.

The United Nations forces went on the defensive again before finally settling down along a line near the 38th parallel that looked very much like the trench warfare that MacArthur had detested so much in World War I.

The Principle of Linkage

As Lieutenant Colonel Drew points out in Introduction to Strategy, the essence of the entire strategy process is linkage (3:15). Linkage between the various elements of the strategy process broke down badly in Korea. The primary reasons were lack of coordination, misunderstandings, and divergent perceptions. At the national level, the reasons for being in Korea were never properly elucidated to the American people. While the objectives were fairly clear, the reasons for the objectives were not clear at all.

Communications and coordination proved to be a major stumbling block. The links between the Joint Chiefs and the President were unclear, resulting in communications garbles. The same can be said of all the links between Tokyo and Washington. Washington mistrusted MacArthur, and MacArthur was paranoid about Washington's intention toward him and toward Asia. In contrast to World War II, when linkage had been sound, Korea provided a case study of severed linkages and misunderstandings.

The Principles of Future and Reality

The United States was obviously unprepared to fight an unconventional war in 1950, and Korea was less than an ideal place to attempt one. Unpreparedness is part of both of the above principles. The examples of Greece, Berlin, and others were close at hand and should have forewarned the United States to prepare for conventional war anywhere in the world. The least prepared of all were the troops close at hand, those stationed with the occupation force in Japan.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

PERSONAL LIFE KEY EVENTS

1880	Born in Little Rock, Arkansas
1896	Graduated from West Texas Military Academy, San Antonio, Texas
1912	Father, Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur, died in Wisconsin while making a speech to a reunion of his Civil War unit
1922	First marriage to Louise Cromwell Brooks, a widowed, prominent (and rich) Washington, D.C. socialite
1923	Older Brother, Captain Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Navy, died
1929	Divorced from Louise
1935	Mother died in Manila at age 84
1936	Joins Masons in Manila
1937	Second Marriage to Jean Faircloth of Murfreesboro Tennessee(Jean had recently inherited \$200,000)
1938	Son, Arthur, born in Manila
1952-	Board chairman of Remington Rand(\$48,000/yr.)
1961	Philippine visit (Presidential plane made available to him)
1962	West Point farewell speech(Duty-Honor-Country)
1964	Died. Interred at MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia

APPENDIX B

MILESTONES

Military Schools

1893-1896	West Texas Military Academy, San Antonio, Texas. Valedictorian. 97.33% academic average
1899-1903	United States Military Academy. First Captain of the Corps and Valedictorian. 98.14% academic average

Assignments and Jobs

1903-1904	Engineering duties in the Philippines
1904-1905	Acting Chief Engineering Officer, California Debris Commission, San Francisco, California
1905-1906	Aide to Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur on a nine nation military observation tour of Asia
1906-1907	Aide-de-camp for President Theodore Roosevelt
1907-1908	Engineering School of Application, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
1908	Assistant Engineer, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
1908-1912	Company K Commander, 3rd Battalion of Engineers, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Also served at San Antonio, Texas and detached service to the Canal Zone
1912	Instructor of Engineering, General Services School, Fort Riley, Kansas
1912-1913	Office of the Chief of Engineers, Washington Barracks, D.C.
1913-1917	Member, General Staff Corps, Washington, D.C.

CONTINUED

1917-1918	Chief of Staff, 42nd (Rainbow) Division, Camp Mills, New York, and France
1918	Commander, 84th Infantry Brigade, 42nd Division, France
1918	Commander, 42nd Division, France
1919	Commander 84th Brigade, Army of Occupation, Germany
1919	Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
1919-1922	Superintendent, United States Military Academy
1922-1925	Headquarters, Philippine Department with duty as Commander, District of Manila and Commander 23rd Infantry Brigade at Fort William McKinley
1925	Commander, Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Georgia
1925-1928	Commander, Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Maryland
1928	President, American Olympic Team to Amsterdam, Holland
1928-1930	Commander, Philippine Department, Philippines
1930	Commander, Ninth Corps Area, San Francisco, California
1930-1935	Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D.C.
1935-1937	Military adviser to the Philippine Commonwealth Government
1937	Retired from active duty
1937-1941	Adviser to the Philippine President and Field Marshal in the Philippine Army (at a salary of \$30,000 a year)
1941-1942	Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East

CONTINUED

1942-1945	Commander, United Nations' forces in the South-west Pacific (CINCSWPA)
1945-1951	Supreme Allied Commander Pacific(SCAP), Japan
1950-1951	Commander In Chief Far East Forces(CINCFE)
1950-1951	Commander, United Nations Command, Korea(UNCK)
1951	Relieved of Command by President Truman

Other Significant Career Milestones and Events

1914	Reconnaissance mission to Veracruz, Mexico (Recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor)
1915-1916	War Department Press Sensor, Washington, D.C. (in effect, public relations officer)
1919	Recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor for bravery and heroic actions in France
	NOTE: Douglas MacArthur was probably the most highly decorated American in World War I
1919	Instituted intramural athletics at West Point - the first such program in America
1925	Served on the Billy Mitchell Court Martial Board
1932	Expelled Bonus Expeditionary Force(BEF) from Washington
1934	Implemented Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC)
1941-1942	Defended the Philippines on Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor, against Japanese attack
1942	Declared, "I shall return" (to the Philippines) upon reaching Australia - the slogan of the Pacific Theater during WWII

CONTINUED

- 1942 Awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor
- 1944 Met with President Roosevelt and Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii to discuss Pacific strategy
- 1944 Returned to the Philippines
- 1945 Accepted surrender of Japan on the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay
- 1945 Landed unarmed at Atsugi Airfield, Japan
- 1950 Operation CHROMITE - amphibious landing at Inchon, Korea
- 1950 Instituted "buddy" system(Koreans Attached to U.S. Army - KATUSA) in Korea
- 1950 Met with President Truman on Wake Island
- 1951 Speech before joint session of Congress ("old soldiers never die, they just fade away.")
- 1962 West Point farewell speech: Duty-Honor-Country
- 1964 Died

NOTE: A significant missing link among the milestones of MacArthur's career is the fact he never attended any type of Professional Military Education school.

APPENDIX C

PROMOTIONS

Jun 11, 1903	Graduated from the Military Academy at West Point; commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers
Apr 23, 1904	First Lieutenant
Feb 27, 1911	Captain
Dec 11, 1915	Major
Aug 5, 1917	Colonel, Infantry (by-passed Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun 26, 1918	Brigadier General
Jun 17, 1925	Major General
Nov 21, 1930	General (Chief of Staff of the Army)
Oct 1, 1935	Reverted to his permanent grade of Major General upon completion of his tour as Chief of Staff of the Army
Dec 31, 1937	Retired from the Army
Jan 1, 1938	Field Marshal of the Philippine Army
Jul 26, 1941	Recalled to active duty as a Major General
Jul 27, 1941	Promoted to Lieutenant General
Dec 18, 1941	General
Dec 23, 1944	General of the Army
Apr 11, 1951	Relieved of Command

APPENDIX D

DECORATIONS AND AWARDS

Congressional Medal of Honor
Distinguished Service Cross with Two Oak Leaf Clusters
Distinguished Service Medal with Four Oak Leaf Clusters
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star with Six Oak Leaf Clusters
Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star Medal(Combat) with Arrowhead
Air Medal
Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster
Special Congressional Gold Medal
Sylvanus Thayer Medal

FOREIGN DECORATIONS AND AWARDS

Australian Pacific Star
Belgian Commander Order of Crown
British Knight Grand Cross of Bath
Chinese Grand Cordon of Pae Ting
Czechoslovakian Grand Cross Order of White Lion
Ecuadorian First Class Decoration Abdon Calderon
French Grand Officer Legion of Honor
French Legion of Honor Fourragere
French Medal Militaire Fourragere
French Croix de Guerre with Four Palms
French Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor
Greek Medal of Valor
Guatemala Cross of Military Merit of the First Order
Hungarian Grand Cross Order of Military Merit
Italian War Cross
Italian Grand Cordon Order of the Crown
Japanese Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun with
Paulownia Flowers
Mexican Grand Cross of Military Merit
Netherlands Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Orange-Nassau
with swords
Philippine Medal of Valor
Philippine Distinguished Service Star
Philippine Defense Medal
Philippine Liberation Medal
Polish Grand Croix Polonia Restituta

CONTINUED

Polish Virtutae Militaire
Romanian Grand Cross Order of Military
Yugoslavian Grand Cross Order of White Eagle